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Climate change and critical infrastructure – storms 
This study attempts to elucidate the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure to storms. First, it gauges how 
certain characteristics of storms affect the resilience of the power grid. Then, it presents a methodology for 
assessing the change in the level of risk to critical infrastructure due to the impact of climate change on the 
frequency and severity of storms. 
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Executive summary 
Infrastructure systems are the backbone of modern economies, and critical infrastructure 
resilience is essential to sustainable development. Natural hazards can affect the 
electricity supply and result in power outages which can trigger accidents, bring economic 
activity to a halt and hinder emergency response until electricity supply is restored to 
critical services.  
This study attempts to elucidate the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure to 
storms and outlines how certain characteristics of this hazard affect the resilience of the 
power grid based on forensic analysis. Wind loading and debris impact are the main 
causes of storm damage. Tall, slender structures, such as transmission towers, 
distribution poles and wind turbines are most affected. Transmission and distribution 
assets can also be damaged by the impact of flying debris. Moreover, freezing rain forms 
glaze ice which accumulates on power lines and increases their catenary load. The added 
weight can cause the line to break or distribution poles and transmission towers to 
collapse. Substations were also found to be affected by storms, particularly by inundation 
and airborne debris. However, damage from flying debris was less compared to that 
sustained by transmission and distribution lines. Storms in coastal areas may affect 
transmission and distribution networks by increasing the amount of saltwater deposits on 
electrical equipment. Given adequate preparedness, early warning can help expedite 
recovery by allowing TSOs and DSOs to activate disaster response plans, including surge 
mechanisms and mutual aid agreements, before the storm hits. 
We also present a methodology to investigate the impact of climate change on the risk 
posed by storms to the power grid. Our approach combines a future projection of the 
recurrence interval of selected storm scenarios and the assessment of the estimated 
economic losses incurred by critical infrastructure and those resulting from the disruption 
of daily economic activity. A case study was conducted to demonstrate the methodology 
in a large urban area in Western Europe. We derived the projected peak wind gust of the 
10-, 50- and 100-year storm scenarios for five time periods. For each recurrence 
interval, the cost to repair the damage to overhead lines and the economic losses from 
the interruption of the daily economic activity amount each to about half of the total 
losses. The proportion of the repair cost increases by approximately 10% for the 50-year 
and the 100-year storms compared to the 10-year scenario. This increase causes the 
total expected losses from the 50-year and the 100-year storms to rise as well. 
The duration of the power outage has a major impact on the estimated losses for all 
scenarios across all time periods. In this case study, the increase of the duration of the 
power outage from 3 days to 10 days increases the total expected losses 3.5 times. With 
longer-term power outages, the economic losses caused by interruption of the daily 
economic activity progressively become the main determinant of the total impact. 
The scope of this study is limited to demonstrating the feasibility of the methodology and 
inductively drawing preliminary conclusions regarding the impact of storms on critical 
infrastructure given climate change conditions. It is not intended to supplement, replace 
or challenge existing risk assessment and management plans prepared by Member 
States. 
The following recommendations emerged from the findings of this study: 
— Consider increasing transmission tower design requirements for resistance to wind 
loading in standards and regulations. 
— Consider the risk from climate change in investment analyses. 
— Consider events with recurrence intervals longer than 100 years in hazard mitigation 
and emergency planning. 
— Standardize mutual aid resources. 
— Plan for surge capabilities and external contractors. 
3 
1 Introduction 
Infrastructure systems are the backbone of modern economies, and critical infrastructure 
resilience is essential to the societal well-being and sustainable development. The risk 
environment facing critical infrastructure in Europe is complex and in constant change. 
The Overview of Natural and Man-made Disaster Risks the European Union may face (1) 
outlines numerous natural, technological and human-caused hazards and threats. 
Meteorological hazards, such as floods, storms and wildfires (2), are among those most 
frequently identified by Member States in their National Risk Assessments. In a recent 
study, Forzieri et al. (2016) predict a likely increase in the frequency of extreme weather 
events across Europe. The exposure of coastal and floodplain areas to extreme weather 
is expected to increase. Neumann et al. (2015) estimate that between 82.9 and 85.7 
million people will be living in low-elevation coastal zones (3) and the 100-year floodplain 
in Europe by 2030. 
Because of the high population density and important economic activity, infrastructures 
are also concentrated in coastal and floodplain areas. Therefore, the exposure of critical 
infrastructures to meteorological hazards is likely to increase disproportionately with 
climate change. Forzieri et al. (2018) estimate that damage to critical infrastructure due 
to climate change in Europe could increase to ten times present values by the turn of the 
century, but southern and southeastern European countries will be most affected. The 
impact of storm surge, riverine and flash flooding, and windstorms on critical 
infrastructure is expected to increase across Europe. The losses are likely to be highest 
for the chemical, manufacturing, transportation and energy sectors. 
Several authors (Forzieri et al., 2018; Neumann et al., 2015; Mechler et al., 2014) 
highlight the need for further research in the quantification of vulnerability of critical 
infrastructures to meteorological hazards. This study focuses on the energy sector, 
mainly because of its ubiquity in everyday life and the dependence of all other critical 
infrastructures on a reliable supply of electric power (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). A 
previous study (Karagiannis et al., 2017b) presented a methodology to investigate the 
impact of climate change on the risk posed by floods to critical infrastructure and 
suggested the approach be expanded to other natural hazards as well. 
This study attempts to elucidate the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure to 
storms, with emphasis placed on the power grid. First, we discuss the impact of storms 
on the power grid and outline how certain characteristics of this type of hazard affect the 
resilience of the power grid using forensic analysis. Second, we present a methodology to 
investigate the impact of climate change on the risk posed by storms to the power grid 
infrastructure. Our approach combines a future projection of the recurrence interval of 
selected storm scenarios and the assessment of the estimated losses incurred to critical 
infrastructure and those resulting from the disruption of daily economic activity. A case 
study was conducted to demonstrate the methodology in a large urban area in Western 
Europe. The scope of this study aims at demonstrating the feasibility of the methodology 
and inductively drawing preliminary conclusions regarding the impact of storms on critical 
infrastructure given climate change conditions. It is not intended to supplement, replace 
or challenge existing risk assessment and management plans prepared by Member 
States. 
This is a two-part study. Chapter 2 is the first part, which is intended to improve the 
understanding of power grid’s resilience to storms. It is based on the analysis of past 
storm occurrences and their impact on the power grid. Its purpose is to inform policy-
                                           
(1) Commission Staff Working Document: Overview of Natural and Man-made Disaster Risks the European 
Union may face, Brussels, 23.5.2017, SWD(2017) 176 final, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-
site/files/swd_2017_176_overview_of_risks_2.pdf (accessed October 29, 2018) 
(2) NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity/Continuity of 
Operations Programs, 2016, https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-
codes-and-standards/detail?code=1600 (accessed October 30, 2018) 
(3) Defined as the contiguous and hydrologically connected zone of land along the coast and below 10 m of 
elevation (Neumann et al., 2015). 
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making and strategic and disaster risk management planning in the European Union and 
Member States. Additionally, however, this analysis serves as a foundation of the risk 
assessment methodology that follows. Specifically, Chapter 3 is the second part of this 
study and outlines a methodology for the estimation of the change in the risk level of 
failure or disruption of the power grid resulting from the impact of climate change on the 
frequency and severity of storms. Risk is quantified in economic terms to support cost-
benefit analyses. 
5 
2 Power grid resilience to storms – incident analysis 
Widespread power outages are a common occurrence during storms. This chapter 
examines storm damage to the power grid with a focus on restoration and resilience. It 
endeavors to elucidate how the impact of storms affects the recovery of the power grid. 
It is intended to inform policy-making and disaster risk management planning in the 
European Union Member States. 
2.1 Research design and data collection 
The research design for this part of the study was predominantly purposeful. It focused 
on disruptions of the power grid caused by storms and explored the relationship between 
recovery time and hazard characteristics. This part was data-driven, using an inductive 
approach. The findings in this chapter are based on the analysis of lessons identified 
from 52 storms, including tropical and extratropical cyclones, as well as ice, snow and 
wind storms (Figure 1) affecting 14 countries in 4 continents (the full list of the events is 
included in the Annex). Whenever a storm affected more than one countries, a separate 
record was made for each affected country, producing a total of 58 cases (4). Cyclones 
made up approximately 2/3 of our sample, followed by wind storms. 
Figure 1. Breakdown of storms reviewed in this study, by type 
 
Source: JRC 
Storms were included in the analysis if they caused damage to power grid components. 
This study was based exclusively on publicly available information. Sources 
included the scientific literature, technical reports, disaster response operations situation 
reports and press articles. The quality, detail and granularity of data describing the storm 
intensity, damage, power outages and impact on the population were a particular 
challenge. Most of the information in the dataset was categorical, but numerical data was 
considered whenever feasible and available. The level of detail varied across sources. The 
information was sufficient to establish the type of damage and the failure mechanism. 
The affected population was typically reported as the proportion of customers or 
households where the hazard impacts were observed. 
Nevertheless, several limitations undermined data collection and analysis. The intensity 
of the wind storms and cyclones was either reported in terms of the mean wind speed or 
                                           
(4) The terms “records” and “cases” are used here interchangeably. 
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peak wind gust for wind storms, but reporting was inconsistent in terms of the metric 
used. Precipitation height was reported as a proxy of snow and ice storm intensity. In 
addition, the exposure of power grid components to varying storm intensity levels (i.e. 
wind speed or precipitation height) was difficult to establish. Spatial distributions of wind 
speed and/or precipitation were generally neither comprehensive nor readily available.  
Inconsistencies in the description of the impact, location and duration of power outages 
caused by storms were another challenge. The impact of a power outage was described 
in several different units of measurement, including people, customers, households, 
houses, homes, businesses and properties suffering an outage. The impact was described 
with numbers in 55 out of 58 records (including relative descriptions in 14 cases), with 
categorical descriptions in 2 cases, and was unknown in 1 case. Furthermore, several 
different thresholds were used to report recovery time. Information on the duration of 
the outage was available in only 34 cases. Each source used different definitions and 
indicators of recovery. Most sources reported the time needed after the onset of the 
outage to restore power to varying numbers or percentages of affected units (e.g. 
customers, households etc.). 
Information on the type of damage and the types and numbers of affected assets were 
reported in 38 out of 58 cases, of which only 30 included numbers of damaged 
equipment and assets per category. However, it was often unclear whether damage was 
caused by storm-related flooding, wind loading, debris impact, or a combination of the 
above. In addition, the localization of damage or outages was also unclear, and was 
described as a general area, not associated with any clear geographical or administrative 
boundaries, or for the entire event. Similar challenges were noted in a previous study 
(Karagiannis et al., 2017a), but the quality of reported information on storms seems to 
be lower than for earthquakes or floods. Clearly, the granularity of reported 
information needs to be improved if statistical correlations between wind speed 
and the duration of a power outage are to be made at a larger scale. 
In addition, there are inconsistencies in recovery time reporting. First, not all sources 
reported recovery time. Second, different definitions and indicators of recovery were 
used by each reporting source. Some sources defined recovery as the restoration of 
service to the population affected by a power outage, while others as the repair of the 
power grid or subsystems to its pre-disaster state. Last, most sources reported the time 
to achieve a different fraction of complete recovery, such as a percentage of the affected 
population with restored service, or a percentage of power generation. 
Two power grid recovery thresholds were used in this study. The first threshold is the 
restoration of power supply to customers. Both domestic and industrial customers were 
considered, based on available information. This threshold includes efforts directed at 
temporary repairs or workarounds, as well as the use of backup generators. The progress 
of recovery in this case is usually reported in terms of the percentage or number of 
customers with power supply, or the quantity of power supplied, expressed in power 
units or as a percentage of pre-earthquake supply. The second threshold is the complete 
repair of the network, so that temporary solutions, including generators, are no longer 
required. 
2.2 Damage types and storm impact on power grid resilience 
Power outages occurred during all but one of the storms reviewed in this study. The one 
exception was a wind storm which occurred in September 1996 in France (Abi-Samra, 
2010). The high winds collapsed 22 transmission towers and 18 wood poles. Despite the 
collapse of a regional transmission system, equipment located outside the 2-km-wide 
storm track was undamaged and no customers were affected. One reason for the 
limited impact was the narrow storm corridor. 
Storms of all kinds can bring heavy rains, strong winds, hail and lightning, and 
may also spawn tornadoes (Bullock, Haddow & Coppola, 2012). The main causes of 
storm-related damage to electricity network assets are inundation, wind 
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loading and debris impact. Inundation resulting from heavy rains associated with 
storms and storm surge can be detrimental to the power grid. Because water is a good 
conductor of electricity, electrical equipment is highly sensitive to even minute quantities 
of moisture and dirt. Some components, such as transformers and electrified substation 
equipment, may even suffer catastrophic and even explosive failures if wet. The effect of 
flood-related damage has been addressed in Karagiannis et al. (2017b); therefore, this 
report focuses on wind damage, which has also been demonstrated to create significant 
damage to the electricity infrastructure system (Reed et al., 2010). Nevertheless, 
inundation damage is taken into consideration in the analysis when relevant. 
As expected, the areas on or adjacent to the storm’s track were affected the most. All 
other things being equal, the number of people affected by these disruptions increased 
with the peak wind speed and the population density in the affected area. However, the 
data available to us was insufficient to derive a statistical correlation between the peak 
wind speed, the population density in the affected area and the number of people 
affected by the outage. 
Despite the fragmented nature of available data, this analysis helped elucidate important 
aspects of the power grid’s resilience to storms. Table 1 below outlines the main findings. 
Transmission and distribution towers and lines appear to be the most 
vulnerable components of the networks. Utility poles (5) suffer bending failures and 
can be damaged by the impact of flying debris, which may also sever overhead lines. 
Inundation is more severe of a threat for substations. Early warning is possible and, 
together with disaster preparedness, goes a long way in expediting recovery. 
Recovery time ranges between hours and months, depending on the extent of 
the damage and the effectiveness of disaster response. Recovery here is construed 
as the restoration of power supply to all customers who are able to receive it. Given the 
inconsistencies in reporting discussed in the previous section and the inherent 
uncertainty governing temporary repairs and recovery operations, recovery time is 
reported here as a range instead of a precise value. It is driven by the sheer number of 
damaged items and the time it takes to repair or replace them. The following sections 
discuss these aspects in further detail. 
Table 1. Overview of damage types and storm impacts on the resilience of the power grid 
Damage types Bending failure due to wind pressure 
Impact of flying debris 
Inundation (substations mostly) 
Contributing 
factors 
Early warning possible 
Disaster preparedness 
Most vulnerable 
components 
Utility poles and overhead lines 
Substations (including transformers) 
Recovery time 
driven by  
Number of items in need of repair or replacement 
Access to conduct repairs 
Recovery time 
range 
A few hours to six months; most commonly, up to one month. 
Recovery time was longer for hurricanes than for other storms. 
 
                                           
(5) The term “utility poles” is used in this report to refer collectively to transmission and distribution cable-
bearing structures. 
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2.3 Equipment damage and hazard mitigation 
Wind loads increase with wind speed (6), which fluctuates with time and increases with 
height. Close to the ground, the wind is slowed down by friction, while at higher 
elevations, the wind is faster. In structural and environmental engineering, the variation 
of the mean wind speed variation within the atmospheric boundary layer is described 
using power law profiles (Chen & Richard Liew, 2003). Several building codes consider 
that wind speed achieves a practical maximum speed a few hundred meters above 
ground level (Edgar & Sordo, 2017). The friction increases with terrain roughness, which 
depends on the size and number of the surface features on the ground over which the 
wind blows (Figure 2). Therefore, the wind forces exerted on a structure also increase 
with height. 
Figure 2. Wind profiles on different terrain types 
 
Source: Adapted from Bendjebbas et al. (2016) 
Wind forces act inward on the windward side of a structure and outward on the other 
sides (Figure 3). The response of a structure exposed to wind, i.e. the effect of the wind 
on it, depends on the structure’s size, shape and dynamic properties. Higher wind 
pressures are exerted on tall, slender structures presenting a wide profile against 
incoming winds, resulting in higher bending moments and base shear internal forces. 
Impact by debris was the second major cause of damage identified in this study. Falling 
trees or large branches were the most frequently cited examples of this type of effect. 
Because of their high exposure, transmission and distribution towers and lines are 
affected the most. Transmission towers are tall, three-dimensional steel trusses, 
designed to carry and support transmission cables. Several standards apply to the design 
of towers to resist wind loads (Table 2). Because transmission towers transport electricity 
over large distances, they are typically located in the open. They can also be exposed to 
high wind forces due to their height and the absence of surrounding features that could 
mitigate the impact of the wind forces. In addition, these structures may be subjected to 
higher wind pressures when the cross-arms (the members protruding to the side which 
support transmission cables) are facing the wind at a right angle. 
Transmission tower failures were recorded in nearly all incidents reviewed in this 
study. Wind loading produced two distinct mechanisms of damage. The first was 
                                           
(6) Specifically, the wind pressure is proportional to the square of the wind speed. 
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bending failure of the tower under the wind’s distributed horizontal load. This 
mechanism typically causes the affected towers to twist downward. Although the 
photographic evidence available to us was in no way exhaustive, the point of inflection 
appears to be located in the middle third of the structure’s height, above the juncture of 
the legs. In most cases, the horizontal conductor support cross-arms appear to remain 
unaffected, but the tower twists until its top comes to rest on the ground. The second 
mechanism was failure of the tower foundation, causing the structure to tilt. This 
failure mode is typical in hurricanes, when wind pressures are combined with heavy rain 
which reduces the cohesion and resistance of the soil under the tower, causing the 
foundations to fail. 
Figure 3. Wind pressure on structure surfaces (we1 and we2 denote respectively the positive 
pressure exerted on the windward side and the negative pressure exerted on the leeward side of 
the structure) 
 
Source: Eurocode 1, Part 1-4 (European Committee for Standardization, 2010) 
Table 2. Standards applying to the design of transmission towers under wind action 
Organization Standard/Regulation Year 
American Society of 
Civil Engineers 
Guidelines for electrical transmission line structural 
loading, ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering 
Practice No. 74 
1991 
International 
Electrotechnical 
Commission 
(IEC Standard 60826) Design criteria of overhead 
transmission lines. 
2003 
Mexican Federal 
Electricity Commission 
Civil works manual. Chapter of wind design 2008 
American Society of 
Civil Engineers 
(ASCE/SEI 7–10) Minimum design loads for 
buildings and other structures.  
2010 
European Committee for 
Standardization 
(EN 1991-1-4:2005+A1:2010) Eurocode 1: Actions 
on structures – Part 1-4: General actions – Wind 
actions 
2010 
Standards Australia, 
Standards New Zealand 
(AS/NZS 1170.2) Structural design actions. Part 2: 
Wind actions 
2011 
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In addition to direct damage from wind loads, severe damage to transmission towers and 
lines resulted from flying debris. Smaller debris, such as tree branches, may dangle 
and/or shear aerial cables at several points along a line. Larger debris, such as trees, can 
knock down transmission towers and distribution poles, and damage heavy equipment 
upon impact. The numbers of transmission tower failures because of wind loading vs. 
those attributed to debris impact were only available for a fraction of the events reviewed 
in this study. However, wind loading appears to be the most frequent failure mechanism. 
For instance, when cyclones Lothar and Martin hit Europe, most of the damage sustained 
by the French transmission grid resulted from wind loads rather than from debris impact, 
as illustrated in Figure 4. It also appears that 63 and 90 kV towers were much more 
vulnerable to debris damage than 225 and 400 kV towers. In this case, falling trees were 
the main cause of debris damage (OSCE, 2016). 
Furthermore, Figure 4 shows that in absolute terms the number of damaged 63 and 90 
kV towers is more than twice the number of damaged 225 and 400 kV towers. 
Nevertheless, this information alone does not support any conclusions about the 
vulnerability of any type of tower over another to storm damage. Although it can be 
argued that there are more 63 and 90 kV towers than 225 and 400 kV towers in any one 
area, the reported information does not include the number of towers exposed to 
equivalent wind speeds but undamaged. 
The number of exposed (i.e. the sum of out-of-order and undamaged) 63 and 90 kV 
circuits is more than four times higher than the number of exposed 225 kV circuits and 
about 9 times higher than the number of exposed 400 kV circuits. However, 
approximately 8% of exposed circuits of each voltage category went offline. 
Figure 4. Damage to the French transmission grid resulting from cyclones Lothar and Martin: 
towers destroyed by wind and debris (left axis), and circuits out of order (right axis) 
 
Source: OSCE, 2016 
Wind turbines also suffered damage from wind loading. These structures are made of a 
tall and relatively slender column supporting a heavy load at the top. Therefore, despite 
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their aerodynamic shape which somewhat reduces wind pressures, a relatively small 
displacement of the large mass at the top generates a disproportionately greater bending 
moment at the base. The result is a failure mechanism similar to that of transmission 
towers. 
Wooden and concrete distribution poles were also affected. Distribution pole 
failures were more frequent than losses of transmission towers and occurred during 
every storm in this study. The mechanisms of damage were similar to those of 
transmission towers. When subjected to direct wind loading, wooden poles may snap 
(Figure 5) and concrete poles may fail in bending. Although the numbers of failures of 
distribution poles and transmission towers were only available for a fraction of the 
incidents reviewed in this study, the distribution system suffered disproportionately in 
terms of absolute numbers. For instance, Hurricane Katrina damaged 3,000 miles (4,828 
km) of transmission lines and 28,500 miles (45,866 km) of Entergy’s infrastructure in the 
United States (Entergy Corporation, 2005). Although the fraction of this damage 
attributed to flooding, wind forces or debris impact was unclear, transmission and 
distribution substations typically take a higher toll during floods (Karagiannis et al., 
2017a). The higher impact of storms to distribution poles and lines is arguably attributed 
to their higher number in the affected area, as there are more distribution lines than 
transmission lines, and the former tend to be more concentrated in urban areas. 
Figure 5. Snapped utility poles in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, after Hurricane Irma 
 
Source: FEMA, 2017 (7) 
In addition to the effects of wind loads and debris impact, a particular kind of 
transmission and distribution line damage occurs during ice or snow storms. Freezing 
rain forms glaze ice which accumulates on power lines and increases their 
catenary load. The added weight can cause the line to break or distribution poles and 
                                           
(7) Federal Emergency Management Agency, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/images/141939 
(accessed December 5, 2018) 
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transmission towers to collapse. Furthermore, glaze ice may accumulate on trees, 
causing large branches to fall tearing down power lines. For instance, these types of 
effects were quite pronounced during the winter storm which hit the Northeastern United 
States (New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania 
and Maine) in December 2008, leaving 1,365,500 customers without power. In the State 
of New York alone, National Grid replaced 350 utility poles and 235 km of cables (Nelson 
et al., 2009). 
Substations were also affected by storms in this study, albeit to a lesser extent 
compared to transmission and distribution lines. Inundation and airborne debris 
were the leading mechanism of damage. Because electrical equipment is often 
sensitive to even minute amounts of moisture and dirt, flooding can take substations 
offline for days or weeks (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). Flying debris may also affect 
substation equipment, such as transformer retaining structures. Records of substation 
damage were found in 15 (out of 52) storms reviewed in this study. Of those, 12 were 
related to hurricanes and 3 to other types of storms. Hurricane records were unclear as 
to whether damage was due to flooding, wind loading or airborne debris. Other than 
inundation, substations went offline when they were disconnected from the grid 
because power lines were severed due to tower failures or debris. 
Storms in coastal areas may affect transmission and distribution networks by 
increasing the amount of saltwater deposits on electrical equipment. As 
discussed in Karagiannis et al. (2017a), this may cause catastrophic failure of some 
electrified devices. Non electrified equipment may also be affected, because the saltwater 
deposits must be thoroughly cleaned before the equipment gets back online. 
Several mitigation strategies have been used to increase the grid’s resilience to storms. 
One example is the use of alternative tower designs which limit the structure’s response 
to wind loads. For instance, according to a report by the Puerto Rico Energy Resiliency 
Working Group (2017), monopole towers fared better than the lattice structures when 
Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico in 2017. Although not specified in the report, it is safe to 
presume that the reason is that their narrower profile reduces wind pressures. Another 
structural mitigation method is strengthening the foundations of transmission towers to 
reduce their vulnerability to toppling. This measure may also help to mitigate against 
flood and earthquake hazards (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). 
However, structural mitigation measures may have unwanted side-effects. For 
example, one flood mitigation strategy involves elevating vulnerable equipment, such as 
switchgear and relays, above the expected water level (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). 
However, this strategy may expose substation equipment to debris impact. For instance, 
airborne debris was the primary cause of heavy damage caused by Hurricane Rita to 
elevated substation equipment in Texas (Reed et al., 2010). 
2.4 Early warning, emergency response and recovery 
Early warning can play a significant role in electricity grid resilience during storms. 
Modern weather forecasting systems can provide notification of a forming storm system 
or worsening weather conditions with a lead time of a few days, depending on local and 
regional conditions. Uncertainty is inherent in all hydrometeorological predictions, but is 
seldom communicated with weather forecasts. The lack of information on the uncertainty 
of weather predictions can undermine decision-making in disasters (National Research 
Council, 2006). 
Although there is little that can be done to protect power grid assets from high winds in 
the hours or days before a storm hits, early warning is a significant component of 
electricity resilience in two ways. First, effective early warnings can help TSOs and 
DSOs mitigate the effects of the inundation caused by the intense rainfall which 
often comes with storms, by preemptively shutting down substations which 
may be flooded. This measure prevents catastrophic damage which would otherwise be 
caused when electrified equipment came in contact with water and reduces the asset 
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recovery time to that needed for cleanup and repair (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). Second, 
early warning gives TSOs and DSOs time to activate their emergency operations 
plans. 
The impact of storms on critical power infrastructure follows a pattern of widespread 
moderate to catastrophic damage to the most vulnerable components along the storm’s 
path. Power grid recovery in the aftermath of storms is therefore driven by the 
need to repair or replace large numbers of utility towers and poles, and replace 
large lengths of electric cables. The success of emergency response for TSOs and 
DSOs is judged by how fast power is brought back online to the maximum number of 
users possible. The need to rapidly conduct a vast number of repairs often exceeds the 
capacities of any single TSO/DSO and generates a demand for rapid repair capability, 
which is highly dependent on disaster preparedness. 
Rapidly increasing electricity infrastructure repair capabilities in the aftermath of a major 
storm requires mobilizing manpower, equipment and spare parts. TSOs/DSOs often enter 
into mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions to acquire repair crews and 
equipment in the event of an emergency. Additional equipment and spare parts are 
usually acquired through mutual aid agreements, from corporate suppliers, or both. 
Response-generated demands include shelter, food and water for both mutual aid and 
home-based repair crews, transportation for people and equipment, fuel and 
consumables. For example, the rapid restoration of power to every customer of 
Mississippi Power who could receive it in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is largely 
attributed to the company’s efficient disaster logistics (Ball, 2006). 
Lessons identified after the response to a severe winter storm that hit Slovenia in 2014 
emphasize the need for disaster preparedness in a European context. Over the 
course of five days, from January 30 to February 3, 2014, between 40 and 200 mm of 
precipitation fell on most of the country. In the western and southwestern part of the 
country, rainfall reached 300 mm (Markosek, 2015). Freezing rain caused extensive 
damage to the country’s transmission and distribution infrastructure. Electro Ljubljana 
rapidly reinforced their capabilities through mutual aid agreements with foreign 
distribution companies. The response effort was carried out by 1,500 people from civil 
protection, fire/rescue, the military, voluntary organizations, construction companies and 
electricity companies. The use of temporary transmission towers was particularly 
effective, as it helped to rapidly reconnect transmission substations to the grid (OSCE, 
2014). 
However, several problems hampered the response and slowed down recovery efforts. 
Most were due to the lack of interoperability with non-traditional responders and mutual 
aid resources. First, record keeping during the operation was a challenge, because 
different companies used different systems. Second, local surge arrangements lacked 
efficiency. Several workers were engaged without written agreements, either because 
printing was impossible due to the power outage, or because of the perceived urgency to 
make the resources available in the field. Contractors selected through a tender were 
sometimes unfamiliar with the area. Many volunteers were former employees of the 
company, by then retired. Despite their technical competencies, they could not be 
insured and were thus assigned less difficult tasks. Third, language barriers hampered 
communications with mutual aid crews. In addition, local staff were tied liaising with 
mutual aid crews which were unfamiliar with the area and local practices, which reduced 
the number of available local resources. Last, transportation was difficult because of road 
closures, and cellular service was interrupted as soon as base stations ran out of backup 
power. Until power was at least partially restored, the operation had to rely only on 
satellite communications (OSCE, 2014). 
Access is also a major determinant of the power grid recovery in the aftermath 
of storms. Transmission towers are often located in remote areas serviced by dirt roads 
which are easily blocked by landslides and debris such as fallen trees. For instance, most 
towers damaged by Hurricane Rita were located in marshes and were thus difficult to 
access (Reed et al., 2010). Relocating transmission towers alongside main roads is likely 
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to increase the grid’s resilience. Although it is unknown whether this strategy will reduce 
the failure rate of towers, it is argued that it will make it easier for repair crews to access 
damage locations and thus speed up recovery. Distribution lines are usually located 
alongside urban and suburban roads, which may also be blocked by debris. However, 
urban and suburban roads are more accessible than dirt roads in mountainous regions 
and are also usually easier to clear by heavy equipment. 
One successful response strategy involves phasing the operation to protect 
repair crews, responders and equipment, by keeping them out of the hazard 
zone. This means staging local and mutual aid resources at the edge of a hurricane zone 
or sheltering them inside strong buildings while the storm passes. Resources are then 
typically deployed after the storm has passed. For example, Mississippi Power used this 
strategy to streamline its response to Hurricane Katrina (Ball, 2006). This course of 
action is also popular in search and rescue operations in the aftermath of hurricanes. 
Another successful strategy involved the use of temporary transmission towers. 
Called Emergency Restoration Systems (ERS) or simply Restoration Towers in some 
countries, these versatile structures are relatively easy to transport and can be erected 
with minimal equipment. Although a transmission tower may take 10 days to build, a 
trained crew can erect an ERS tower within a day or two (Karagiannis, et al., 2017a) and 
allow a TSO to quickly restore a line until a permanent structure is built. Such ERS 
towers were used by Electro Ljubljana in the aftermath of the 2014 ice storm and 
contributed a lot to the quick recovery. 
 
 
15 
3 Effects of climate change on the level of risk from an 
economic perspective 
A pan-European multi-hazard analysis by Forzieri et al. (2016) indicates that the 
frequency and severity of windstorms is likely to increase in coastal areas in Western, 
Eastern and Northern Europe. Because of the high population density and intense 
economic activity of coastal areas, the level of risk is likely to increase substantially. This 
chapter demonstrates a methodology for the estimation of the change in the level of risk 
(quantified in economic terms) of failure or disruption of the power grid resulting from 
the impact of climate change on the frequency and severity of storms. The assessment of 
the level of risk is based on the estimation of potential losses from wind loads on the 
transmission grid. A selected area in Europe is used as a case study. 
3.1 Methodology 
Disaster risk results from the probability of occurrence of a storm and the severity of the 
impact of the event. The probability may be expressed either qualitatively or 
quantitatively, depending on the level of knowledge about each hazard. The severity is 
expressed in terms of the expected morbidity and mortality, damage to property, 
disruption of infrastructure, and social consequences (Agius et al., 2017). The scenario-
based approach is a popular disaster risk analysis methodology and is highly appropriate 
for the analysis of hazards when statistical information is available. 
Here, the change in the level of risk is estimated by the change in the probability and the 
impact severity of storms. Specifically, we analyze the change in the level of risk incurred 
by the increase or decrease of the probability of occurrence of several storm scenarios 
brought about by climate change. For each scenario, the level of risk is derived as the 
expected value of the economic losses resulting from the storm under review (Hickman & 
Zahn, 1966). The following sections discuss how we determine the change of the 
probability of occurrence of each scenario and estimate the losses. 
3.1.1 Probability of occurrence 
The probability of occurrence of a storm is quantified by its recurrence interval, defined in 
this case as the average number of years between storms of the same intensity (8). 
Using the approach discussed in Forzieri et al. (2016; 2018), we derived the projected 
peak wind for a range of recurrence intervals over several future time slots. We use the 
ensemble mean values from 15 simulations combining different Global Circulation Models 
(GCMs) with different Regional Climate Models (RCMs) at a resolution of 0.11 degrees, as 
in the EURO-CORDEX (9) framework (Table 3). The return levels were computed using a 
peak-over-threshold (98.5%) generalized Pareto distribution with daily maximum wind 
speed as the input variable. 
3.1.2 Loss estimation 
Each scenario is analyzed to determine the consequences of the storm on the affected 
communities. The potential losses are a function of the intensity of the hazard and the 
exposure of people and economic activities to that hazard. Loss estimations conducted in 
support of disaster risk assessments and hazard mitigation plans consider the expected 
losses to people, buildings, infrastructure and other community assets (Coppola, 2015). 
Here, loss estimation includes the economic losses from the damage incurred to electric 
utilities and the impact to the local economy from the power outage. The total losses due 
to each scenario are calculated as the sum of the costs to repair the damage incurred to 
                                           
(8) The actual number of years between storms of any given intensity varies a lot. A common misconception 
about the 100-year storm is that it is likely to happen only once in 100 years. In reality, a 100-year storm 
is the storm which has a 1% annual exceedance probability, that is, a 1% chance of occurring every year. 
In other words, it is possible for the 100-year storm to occur two or more times per year. 
(9) Coordinated Downscaling Experiment - European Domain, https://www.euro-cordex.net/ (accessed 
December 4, 2018) 
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electric utilities and the impact to the local economy resulting from the storm and the 
outage. The process is illustrated in Figure 6 and detailed in the following sections. 
Table 3. List of EURO-CORDEX simulations used in this study 
Simulation Global Circulation Model Regional Climate Model 
1 
ICHEC-EC-EARTH 
DMI-HIRHAM5 
2 KNMI-RACMO22E 
3 CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
4 SMHI-RCA4 
5 
CNRM-CERFACS-CNRM-CM5 
CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
6 SMHI-RCA4 
7 
MPI-M-MPI-ESM-LR 
CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
8 MPICSC-REMO2009 
9 SMHI-RCA4 
10 
MOHC-HadGEM2-ES 
KNMI-RACMO22E 
11 CLMcom-CCLM4-8-17 
12 SMHI-RCA4 
13 NCC-NorESM1-M DMI-HIRHAM5 
14 
IPSL-IPSL-CM5A-LR 
IPSL-INERIS-WRF331F 
15 SMHI-RCA4 
Source: EURO-CORDEX (10) 
The underlying assumption is that the power outage associated with the storm 
does not cause additional casualties, injuries, or loss of property. This is likely to 
be an underestimation, because a prolonged power outage is expected to undermine 
disaster response capabilities, disrupt healthcare facilities, render heating and air-
conditioning systems inoperable, generate traffic jams and contribute to traffic accidents 
(Petermann et al., 2011; Karagiannis et al., 2017a). However, existing methodologies 
cannot grasp the secondary effects of power outages, as these depend to a large extent 
on additional parameters, such as local climate and weather, and disaster response 
capabilities. 
3.1.2.1 Losses to critical energy infrastructure 
The direct losses to critical energy infrastructure are estimated as the cost of repairing 
the damaged power grid assets. The repair costs are calculated from the 
replacement value of the assets and the potential for asset failure. The latter is 
estimated from the exposure of assets to the projected peak wind speed using 
appropriate fragility functions (Veeramany et al., 2015). 
                                           
(10) Coordinated Regional Climate Downscaling Experiment, http://www.cordex.org/ (accessed December 4, 
2018). 
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Figure 6. Loss estimation approach 
 
 
First, we determine the exposure of power grid components to the storm. We combined 
geospatial data layers of electricity network assets with storm scenarios (developed as 
discussed in section 3.1.1) to derive the peak wind speed that power grid components 
are exposed to. The storm scenarios yielded the projected peak wind speed values on the 
vertices of a square grid with a .11 degree (approximately 12 km) edge. The projected 
peak wind speed was assumed to expand over the influence zone of each vertex, derived 
using Voronoi/Thiessen polygons (Sen, 2016; Longley et al., 2015). 
Subsequently, fragility functions are used to derive the cost of repairs of damaged 
components from the peak wind speed data. Fragility functions express the conditional 
probability a damage state will be reached or exceeded as a function of the intensity of 
the hazard (Porter, 2015). Several fragility functions have been developed for towers and 
transmission lines (Dunn et al., 2018; Fu et al., 2017; Espinoza et al., 2016), which have 
been shown by the analysis of previous storms discussed in Chapter 2 to suffer more 
damage from windstorms than any other type of power grid asset. In their general form, 
storm fragility functions relate the probability of damage to the peak wind speed: 
 𝐹𝑑(𝑥) = 𝑃[𝐷 ≥ 𝑑|𝑋 = 𝑥] (1) 
where: 
— D = 0, 1... : damage state of a particular asset 
— d: a particular damage state 
— X: value of the hazard, i.e. the peak wind speed 
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— x: a particular value of X 
The wind speed at the height of transmission lines is estimated from simulation values 
using the logarithmic law discussed in Troen & Lundtang Petersen (1989): 
 
𝑢2 = 𝑢1
ln
𝑧2
𝑧0
ln
𝑧1
𝑧0
 (2) 
where: 
— z2: height at which the wind speed is sought (m) 
— z1: reference height at which the wind speed is known (m) 
— u2: wind speed at height z2 (m/s) 
— u1: wind speed at reference height z1 (m/s) 
— z0: surface roughness, taken from Table 4 (m) 
Table 4. Roughness length values used in this study and corresponding landscape types 
Roughness 
length (m) 
Landscape type 
0.0002 Water surface. 
0.03 Open agricultural area without fences or hedgerows and very scattered 
buildings. Only softly rounded hills. 
0.4 Villages, small towns, agricultural land with many or tall sheltering 
hedgerows, forests and very rough and uneven terrain. 
0.8 Larger cities with tall buildings. 
Source: Troen & Lundtang Petersen, 1989. 
The failure of a line is considered to be independent from tower failure, so different 
fragility functions are used. In addition, the outage of a transmission tower is considered 
to be independent of the condition of adjacent towers. The total damage is derived from 
the projected peak wind speed and replacement value of each affected facility or asset: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝑅𝐶) = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑑𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗) ∙ 𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=0
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑚
𝑗=1
 (3) 
where: 
— i = 1, 2, …, n : facilities or assets belonging to each category 
— j = 1, 2, …, m : categories of facilities or assets 
— RVij: replacement value of each facility or asset i (of each category j) 
— xij: peak wind speed at each facility i (of each category j) 
— fdj(xij): fragility function of facility or asset category. 
3.1.2.2 Impact on the local economy 
The effect of the power outage on the local economy is approximated by the economic 
activity that is interrupted, on a per capita basis. When all circuits supplying power to a 
transmission substation fail because of wind shear and/or wind-borne debris, customers 
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connected to that substation will lose power, unless the TSO can reroute power from 
another location. Most transmission systems use three-wire, three-phase circuits, which 
are arranged in corridors consisting on series of transmission towers. In transmission 
grids designed for robustness and resilience, there may be more than one circuits in each 
corridor and each substation may be supplied by more than one corridor. In this study, a 
substation was assumed to lose power when all lines supplying it power were severed. A 
transmission line was assumed to be severed when there was at least one failure of a 
tower or a wire between two substations. Therefore, the probability of a substation losing 
power is determined based on the probability of failure of its power supply: 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑡 = ∏ 𝐹𝐶
𝑚
𝐶=1
= ∏ [1 − ∏(1 − 𝐹𝑇)
𝑛
𝑇=1
]
𝑚
𝐶=1
 (4) 
where: 
— Fout: probability of outage of a given substation 
— FC: probability of failure of corridor C 
— n: number of line segments in corridor C 
— m: number of corridors supplying the substation 
— FT: probability of failure of a line segment T (a line may include one or more circuits, 
and each circuit is made of three wires) 
The area affected by the loss of power to a transmission substation is approximated by 
its influence zone, which is derived using Voronoi/Thiessen polygons (Sen, 2016; Longley 
et al., 2015). The combination of the affected area with a population density map yields 
the number of people affected by the outage. 
The business losses from the outage are approximated by the daily economic activity 
that is interrupted (Zimmerman et al., 2005). The outage stops all business in the 
affected area until power is back online. Costs are estimated on a per capita basis. The 
business losses from power loss at a single substation are estimated by the following 
equation: 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐵𝐶) =
𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∙ 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∙ 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑡
365 ∙ 𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡
 (5) 
where: 
— GDP: the Gross Domestic Product of the jurisdiction under review 
— tout: the estimated duration of the outage (in days). 
— Ptot: the jurisdiction’s entire population. 
— Pout: the population affected by the outage. 
Then, the total business cost is the sum of the future business losses from the loss of 
power at each individual substation: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑇𝐵𝐶) = ∑ 𝐵𝐶𝑖
𝑘
 (6) 
This formulation is based on three underlying assumptions. The first is that the power 
outage lasts longer than the storm, therefore the first term in the numerator of the 
Business Cost (BC) formulation is dominated by the duration of the outage and not of the 
storm. This is a realistic hypothesis, because the repair of damaged electric utility assets 
only starts after the storm has passed. The second assumption is that the duration of the 
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outage is the same throughout the affected area. This could be an overestimation, 
because power is restored progressively as repairs are made (Karagiannis et al., 2017a). 
The third assumption is that the local economic activity is homogeneously distributed 
throughout the storm affected area. This could be an underestimation or overestimation 
of the business cost, depending on the locus of economic activities. For instance, if 
business is more concentrated near the coast, then the estimated business cost will be 
lower than the actual one. On the other hand, if local businesses are located away from 
the coast, then the estimated cost would constitute an overestimation. 
3.1.3 Change in risk level 
The combined impact is calculated as the sum of the total repair cost and the impact to 
the local economy resulting from the outage. Then, the level of risk is derived as the 
present value of the expected future losses incurred from each scenario (Hickman & 
Zahn, 1966): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐸 [∑
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑖)𝑁
𝑁
𝑡=1
+ ∑
𝑇𝐵𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑖)𝑁
𝑁
𝑡=1
] (7) 
where: 
— TRCt: the total repair cost in year t, which is calculated using equation (3) 
— TBCt: the expected business losses in year t, which are calculated using equation (5) 
— i: the social discount factor  
— N: the number of years in the future 
We analyze the change in the level of risk (expressed in terms of the expected economic 
losses) caused by the change (increase or decrease) of the probability of occurrence of 
several storm scenarios because of climate change. 
In valuation analysis, the concept of time value of money reflects the notion that money 
available today is worth more than in the future. Therefore, a discount factor is used to 
convert future cash flows in their equivalent present values. In this case, cash flows are 
the expected total repair cost and business losses over an extended period of time in the 
future. From the point of view of a private entity, such as a TSO or DSO, the discount 
rate is the interest it has to pay. On the other hand, governments use what is called the 
social discount rate, which reflects the relationship between the interest rate faced by 
consumers and producers (Stiglitz & Rosenbauer, 2015). The choice of the social discount 
rate is a contested political issue and differs widely among countries. For instance, the 
European Commission advocates a social discount rate of 3-5% for major projects funded 
under the Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 programming period (DG REGIO, 2015). However, 
Member States use different social discount rates for different projects (Evans, 2006), or 
may have not regulated a social discount rate at all. 
Another set of difficulties arise with the change in the characteristics of the study area 
over an extended period of time. First, the GDP of any country is expected to change in 
response to the country’s economic environment, resources and other factors. All other 
things being equal, an increase in the GDP would bring about a proportionate increase of 
the business cost estimated from Equations 5 and 6, but also arguably increase the 
affected country’s resilience. Shocks such as economic crises are notorious for being able 
to dramatically shrink the economy of the affected country to a fraction of its pre-crisis 
capability. However, economic outlooks are notoriously uncertain for periods of time 
longer than one or two years (Silver, 2012), let alone a few decades, as is the case in 
this study. 
Second, population density is dynamic and depends on the population and land use. The 
United Nations World Population Prospects (2017) project that Europe’s population will 
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steadily decline by approximately 12% until 2100. Nevertheless, this trend is not 
homogeneous across the continent and the population of some EU Member States is 
expected to increase. In addition, landscape and land use cannot be expected to remain 
constant over several decades, yet are impossible to predict with any reasonable 
accuracy for the needs of our study. Different combinations of changes in population and 
land use would have wide ranging results in the business cost estimated from Equations 
5 and 6. All other things beings equal, a homogeneous increase in the population density 
of the affected country would have no effect on the business cost, because the increases 
in the population of the affected country and the area suffering a power outage would 
cancel each other out. However, if the change was heterogeneous across the country, for 
instance, if the population increased more in urban areas and less in rural areas, then the 
business cost would change accordingly. 
Last, critical infrastructure itself is aging. If no maintenance is undertaken, the condition 
of infrastructure assets and equipment may have been seriously degraded within the 
timeframe of this study. A degradation of the serviceability would only naturally increase 
the vulnerability to natural hazards. On the other hand, ongoing maintenance can slow 
down the aging process and new projects could add to the power grid’s resilience through 
distributed generation, increased centrality and hazard mitigation measures. However, 
whether any such actions, or a combination thereof, will be undertaken or not, and by 
when, is impossible to foresee with any accuracy. 
3.2 Demonstration of the methodology 
A case study, based on a coastal metropolitan area in Europe, was used to demonstrate 
how the methodology outlined in section 3.1 would be implemented. The following 
sections outline the implementation. Section 3.2.1 presents the case study site. In the 
interest of avoiding the unintentional disclosure of any potential vulnerabilities, every 
effort has been made to maintain the anonymity of the case study site, even at the cost 
of the accuracy of the results. Section 3.2.2 discusses the change in the projected peak 
wind speed for several return periods given two climate change scenarios. Section 3.2.3 
describes the impact severity of the storm scenarios, which was approximated by the 
damage to transmission grid assets and the interruption of the daily economic activity in 
the area because of the storm and the power outage. The change in the level of risk is 
outlined in Section 3.2.4. 
3.2.1 Case study site 
Galorndon is an anonymized sub-regional administrative division with a Chief Elected 
Official – Council type of government. It has a population of approximately 1,500,000 
and a surface area of about 10,000 km2. Galorndon is located on Europe’s Atlantic Coast, 
with two navigable rivers converging near its major urban center, Galorndon Core. The 
topography of Galorndon is relatively flat, with forests in the south and agricultural or 
rural areas throughout its territory. The mean temperature ranges from 6.6oC in January 
to 21.4oC in August. The average annual rainfall is 944 mm, with a peak in November 
(110 mm). Electricity in the country Galorndon is managed in accordance with European 
and national law. The choice of the site was driven by the availability of the data needed 
for the loss estimation discussed in section 3.1.2, notably geospatial information on the 
transmission grid and the characteristics of components such as lines and substations. 
3.2.2 Hazard analysis 
Using the approach discussed in Forzieri et al. (2016; 2018), we derived the projected 
peak wind speed of the 10-, 50- and 100-year storm scenarios for five time periods, i.e. 
from 1981 to 2010, from 2011 to 2040, from 2021 to 2050, from 2031 to 2060, and 
from 2041 to 2070. In conjunction with the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, we used two 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) emission scenarios. The RCP8.5 scenario 
represents very high greenhouse gas emission, which continues to rise even after 2100, 
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whereas the RCP4.5 scenario calls for the stabilization of radiative climate forcing at the 
end of the century (Moss et al., 2008). 
Under both RCPs, the intensity of today’s storms for a given return period would change 
in the future. The estimated peak wind velocities are generally greater for RCP8.5 than 
for RCP4.5. However, the variance of the projected velocities is generally more limited 
under the RCP8.5. Because of the relevance of this study to civil protection and critical 
infrastructure protection policies, we demonstrate the risk analysis using the RCP8.5, 
which is representative of the 90th percentile of the baseline CO2 emissions range (Moss 
et al., 2008), as a reasonable worst-case scenario. Nevertheless, the methodology can be 
used for any RCP. 
The annual probability of occurrence of each event is calculated from the return period 
assuming a Poisson process. For each scenario, we used a logarithmic law (Equation 2) 
to estimate the wind speed based on local factors, such as the above ground level (AGL) 
height of the affected transmission towers and land use. Table 5 below shows one 
example. 
Table 5. Estimation of the wind speed [m/s] for a transmission tower with a height of 18m AGL, 
located in a residential area with a surface roughness of 0.4m 
Scenario 50-year storm 100-year storm 
Time 
slot 
1
9
8
1
-2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
-2
0
4
0
 
2
0
2
1
-2
0
5
0
 
2
0
3
1
-2
0
6
0
 
2
0
4
1
-2
0
7
0
 
1
9
8
1
-2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
-2
0
4
0
 
2
0
2
1
-2
0
5
0
 
2
0
3
1
-2
0
6
0
 
2
0
4
1
-2
0
7
0
 
Area 
wind 
speed 
28.72 28.88 28.74 28.69 28.72 29.61 29.73 29.58 29.53 29.6 
Local 
wind 
speed 
29.72 29.81 29.73 29.63 29.54 32.51 32.70 32.54 32.48 32.51 
3.2.3 Loss estimation 
3.2.3.1 Data and assumptions 
The transmission grid layers were obtained from the open data platform of the country’s 
TSO. In this study, we used the layers of substations and transmission lines. There are 
41 transmission substations (maximum voltages of 400 kV down to 63 kV) and over 227 
km of transmission lines (400 kV, 225 kV, 90 kV and 63 kV). Figure 7 below illustrates 
the transmission network in and around Galorndon. The jurisdiction’s layers were taken 
from the country’s open data portal and the transmission grids layers from the open data 
portal of the country’s TSO. There are 41 substations and over 227 km of lines. We 
assumed no significant upgrade in or degradation of the transmission grid infrastructure 
until 2070. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, tall, slender structures, such as transmission towers, 
distribution poles and wind turbines are most affected by storms. Transmission and 
distribution assets can also be damaged by the impact of flying debris. Substations were 
also found to be affected by storms, particularly by inundation and airborne debris, albeit 
to a lesser extent compared to transmission and distribution lines. Nevertheless, fragility 
functions have been developed for transmission towers  and lines only (among others, 
Dunn et al., 2018; Panteli & Mancarella, 2015; Prahl et al., 2015; Prahl et al., 2016; 
Winkler et al., 2010). Winkler et al., (2010) use building fragility functions to estimate 
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the potential losses to transmission substations. Here, we used the analytical fragility 
functions for transmission towers and overhead lines developed by Panteli & Mancarella 
(2017). This family of fragility functions, which includes separate functions for overhead 
lines and towers, was considered a better fit for the needs of this particular study than a 
single fragility or damage function for both types of assets across a corridor. Panteli et al. 
(2017) highlight the relative lack of empirical fragility functions and the high costs 
associated with the development of experimental fragility curves for transmission towers 
and overhead lines. The replacement value of transmission lines was considered as € 
900,000 per km (ICF Consulting, 2002). 
Figure 7. Map of the transmission grid on and around Galorndon (white: substations and overhead 
lines; black: underground lines) 
 
Source: JRC. Background: Bing®. 
In this particular case, the projected peak wind speeds were quite low, consequently the 
probability of damage to individual transmission towers was consistently null according to 
the base case fragility function proposed by Panteli et al. (2017). Therefore, the analysis 
shows no damage to transmission towers. This outcome however is in contrast to the 
incident analysis in Chapter 2, which indicates that transmission towers are affected in 
nearly every storm in that dataset. 
In addition, as discussed in section 3.1.2.2, a substation was assumed to lose power 
when all lines supplying it with power were severed. When a substation loses power, all 
customers connected to that substation will lose power, unless the TSO can reroute 
power from another location. The area affected by the loss of power to a transmission 
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substation is approximated by its influence zone, which is derived using Voronoi/Thiessen 
polygons. Therefore, the probability of any location experiencing a blackout is equal to 
the probability of loss of power to the substation. However, transmission networks are 
built so that each higher-voltage substation supplies power to one or more lower-voltage 
substations and so on. For example, each 400 kV substation will be supplying power to 
several 225 kV substations, each 225 kV substation will be supplying power to several 90 
or 63 kV substations etc., until power reaches the sub-transmission and distribution 
network. In other words, each customer will be connected to at least one substation from 
each voltage category. Therefore, if we considered the area affected by the loss of power 
to more than one category of substations, we would be counting each location more than 
once and would be estimating the expected business losses based on a largely 
overestimated population. To avoid multiple counting, only 225 kV substations were 
included in the analysis. This voltage category was selected as a good compromise 
between granularity of coverage and the need to minimize the impact of the grid’s 
centrality on the analysis. 
Population density was determined based on national census data for the area under 
consideration. Several assumptions were made in the interest of anonymity, including 
homogeneous population density throughout the case study area and no significant 
population changes since the last population census. With a view to maintaining the 
anonymity of the case study area, we used the same GDP throughout the study period, 
assuming no significant change in the national economy of the case study site until 2070. 
The social discount factor was not included in the calculations for the same reason. 
3.2.3.2 Results 
One of the first outcomes of this approach is the probability of loss of power to individual 
substations. As an example, Figure 8 illustrates the probability of loss of power to each 
225 kV substation in the study area in the 100-year storm for each time slot due to line 
severing. The substations have been designated as A to N. Substation K is by far most 
likely to lose power throughout all 5 time slots, because it is connected to less corridors 
which are exposed to higher wind speeds. By contrast, the probability of loss of supply to 
substations A, D L is negligible, and very limited for substations C, G and J. The lower 
level of risk is due to a combination of two factors. First, these substations are connected 
to more corridors, which makes their power supply more resilient. Second, they are 
exposed to milder winds, which reduces the likelihood of damage to any line or circuit. 
Of particular interest is the lack of significant change of the probability of loss of power 
supply to the substations across the five time periods. This is attributable to the limited 
variation of the intensity of the 100-year storm for short- and medium-term projections. 
The reason of this relative homoscedasticity is that we use the ensemble mean from 15 
simulations, some of which may project an increase in return levels, while others may 
project a decrease. 
The expected economic losses resulting from direct damage to the transmission grid and 
the interruption of daily economic activity are illustrated in Figure 9. Here, it was 
assumed that 400 kV and 225 kV corridors included twin circuits, whereas 90 kV and 63 
kV corridors each included a single circuit. This configuration is used here as an example 
of a typical case in that area. However, the number of circuits for each individual corridor 
can be easily modified according to any grid architecture. In addition, in this case, the 
power outage was assumed to last for three days on average throughout the area. 
For each recurrence interval, the cost to repair the damage to overhead lines and the 
economic losses from the interruption of the daily economic activity amount each for 
about half of the total losses. Nevertheless, the repair cost fraction increases (by 
approximately 10% of the total cost) for the 50-year and the 100-year storms 
compared to the 10-year scenario. Because the projected peak wind speed values 
were relatively low, the risk due to damage to transmission towers was negligible in this 
case. Furthermore, the expected economic losses from each scenario follow a discernible 
pattern across all time slots. Specifically, there is an initial increase in the total economic 
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losses during the period 2011-2040, which is followed by a progressive decrease until 
2070. The change is more pronounced for the 10-year scenario, but remains statistically 
insignificant overall. 
Figure 8. Probability of loss of power to 225 kV substations under the 100-year storm 
 
Figure 9. Expected economic losses from the 10-year, 50-year and 100-year storm across five 
sequential and partially overlapping time periods 
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Moreover, the total expected losses increase (by approximately 10% of the total) 
for the 50-year and the 100-year storms compared to the 10-year scenario. This 
change seems to be driven by the repair cost increase. In other words, the damage to 
the transmission grid becomes more critical for the 50-year and the 100-year scenarios, 
compared to the 10-year storm. Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant increase 
of the economic impact from the 50-year to the 100-year storm. Nevertheless, this result 
is conditional on the assumption of a constant power outage duration across all 
scenarios. Although, ceteris paribus, a higher storm wind speed would arguably result in 
more severe and widespread damage in the affected area, the incident analysis discussed 
in Chapter 2 does not provide sufficient information to correlate the return period of the 
storm with the duration of the power outage. 
The duration of the power outage is indeed an uncertain determinant of the expected 
losses resulting from the disruption of the daily economic activity. On the other hand, the 
Total Repair Cost was assumed to be independent of the duration of the outage for the 
range of recovery times outlined in Table 1. So far, the duration of the power outage was 
assumed to be three days, a minimum emergency planning threshold (McEntire, 2018). 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Karagiannis et al. (2017a), the duration of a power outage 
in any location depends on the duration of the storm (because repairs start when it is 
safe for crews to operate), the extent of the damage, the repair capabilities of the 
TSO/DSO and the prioritization of the repairs. Furthermore, power is restored 
progressively as repairs are made. Figure 10 illustrates the sensitivity of the Total 
Business Cost of the 100-year scenario to the duration of the outage. As the duration of 
the power outage increases from 3 to 10 days, the estimated business cost increases as 
well and progressively becomes the main determinant of the total impact. Whereas at 3 
days, the Total Business Cost is about half the Total Cost, at 10 days it is more than 
double the Total Repair Cost. Investments in emergency repair capabilities can help 
expedite the power grid’s recovery and limit the duration of the outage. A sensitivity 
analysis such as the one discussed here can be useful in estimating whether the 
cost of developing and maintaining these capabilities is justified by the 
mitigation of the impact resulting from the disruption of the daily economic 
activity. 
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Figure 10. Total business cost for different power outage scenarios (note the y-axis scale change 
for 7 and 10-day outage) 
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3.2.4 Risk analysis 
The level of risk is estimated based on the expected economic losses from the storm and 
the power outage it could trigger. Figure 11 presents the level of risk (i.e. the product of 
the occurrence probability and the estimated economic losses) for each scenario. Here, 
the business cost estimation is based on a 3-day power outage. The 10-year scenario 
comes with the highest level of risk and the 100-year scenario is associated with the 
lowest level of risk. Specifically, the risk of the 50-year storm is twice that of the 100-
year storm, and the risk from the 10-year storm is more than three times that of the 50-
year scenario. Nevertheless, the level of risk (expressed in terms of economic losses) 
does not appear to change substantially over time. 
Figure 11. Change in the level of storm risk to critical energy infrastructure in the case study area 
 
 
The risk analysis presents two counter-intuitive outcomes. First, the risk from the 10-
year storm appears to be much higher than the 100-year scenario. Yet the intensity of 
most natural hazards (including meteorological hazards, such as storms) increases as the 
return period increases. In addition, conventional wisdom suggests that more 
devastating storms are a rarer occurrence. However, risk is a function of the probability 
of occurrence and the estimated severity. In this case, the expected losses for the 50-
year and the 100-year storms are 10% greater than those for the 10-year storm. 
Therefore, the level of risk (expressed as economic losses) is driven by the 
probability of each scenario. In other words, the 10-year storm has a higher risk 
because it is expected to occur more frequently. 
As discussed in the previous sections, this outcome is due to several reasons. One is the 
relatively low values of projected wind speeds in the case study area, possibly because of 
the coarse spatial resolution. With these projections, the estimated probability of damage 
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to transmission lines was limited and no damage was expected to occur to transmission 
towers at all. In addition, the increase of the projected wind speed from the 10-year to 
the 50-year to the 100-year scenario is relatively limited and does not result in a 
significant increase of the probability of damage to transmission lines, and therefore of 
the probability of loss of power to substations. Therefore, the increase of the total 
expected losses from the 10-year to the 50-year and the 100-year storm is about 10%. 
Another reason is that the increase of the estimated business losses is limited because of 
the assumption of a constant duration resulting from the power outage. One could argue 
that the 100-year storm would be more intense and therefore produce more damage 
than the 10-year storm. For a constant repair capability level, more damage would 
arguably prolong the recovery period and thus lead to a longer power outage. However, 
the relationship between the level of damage and the duration of the power outage may 
not be linear, and the available data are insufficient to produce a mathematical 
correlation. Furthermore, the projected peak wind speed values are greater for the 100-
year storm than for the 50-year and the 10-year storms, but the difference is relatively 
limited. 
The second outcome of the risk analysis which merits discussion is that the level of risk 
does not appear to change significantly over time. Although the difference in the level of 
risk among the 10-year, the 50-year and the 100-year scenarios is dominated by the 
scenario probabilities, the change over time is driven by the estimated impact, which was 
shown above to have statistically insignificant changes. In this particular case, this 
means that climate change would not result in a substantial change of the level 
of risk posed from storms to the power grid in Galorndon. At first glance, this 
finding could be interpreted as an overall limited change of the risk of economic losses 
from storms to the power grid under climate change. However, we argue against such a 
generalization. This finding is probably due to the use of the ensemble mean from 15 
simulations, which may project an increase or decrease in return levels. More 
importantly, Forzieri et al. (2018) underline that it is the Mediterranean, not Europe’s 
Atlantic coast, which is likely to be most exposed to storms in light of climate change. 
Therefore, the analysis of the risk of an area with higher exposure to wind loads and 
perhaps a less resilient power grid could arguably yield a much greater change in the 
level of risk. 
The findings of the risk analysis demonstrate a favorable case for Galorndon. Specifically, 
the highest level of risk of economic losses stems from the 10-year storm. Therefore, 
prevention and preparedness efforts should focus on this scenario. The overall low 
level of probability of failure of individual assets suggests that investing in 
emergency repair and recovery capabilities should be economically justified in 
this case, as the initial investment and maintenance cost will be spread over most, if not 
all, assets and over a large time frame. 
3.3 Discussion 
The purpose of this study has been to elucidate the vulnerability of critical infrastructure 
to storms, especially in light of climate change. We have focused on critical energy 
infrastructure as a first step. In what follows, we first discuss the implications of this 
study for disaster risk management, then we outline the limitations of the case study. 
As any modeling effort, our results may be suffering from the epistemic uncertainty 
related to our understanding of climate change and the impact of natural hazards on 
infrastructure. In this case, the estimated impact of climate change on the level of risk is 
critically dependent on the potential uncertainties in the data and the climate models 
used. Due to the coarse spatial resolution and the intrinsic features of climate models, in 
particular the Global Circulation Models, extreme values may be reduced and simulations 
may yield lower than expected peak wind speeds for single events. Moreover, the fragility 
functions for storms are less mature compared to those for other natural hazards, such 
as earthquakes or floods. 
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Second, Voronoi/Thiessen polygons effectively approximate the influence zone of each 
substation, but they come with two disadvantages. First, the influence zone determined 
by the Thiessen polygon may not correspond to the actual area receiving power from the 
substation. In other words, the distribution network may be built in such a way that each 
client does not get power from their nearest substation. Second, the use of Thiessen 
polygons assumes that each client may receive electricity from only one substation. If 
that substation is shut down, then this client loses power until the substation is brought 
back online. However, each client may be connected to two or more substations, and 
redundancies are often built into the transmission grid (and more often in the distribution 
grid), which allow TSOs to switch to a different source when a substation is shut down. 
Third, as discussed in a previous study (Karagiannis et al., 2017b) the methodology 
presented in Chapter 3 does not take into account the interdependencies between the 
power grid and other critical infrastructure systems, and may underestimate the severity 
of the consequences. The impact of dependencies and interdependencies on the 
resilience of critical infrastructure systems is notorious (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Pescaroli & 
Alexander, 2016). In addition, electricity is recognized as the critical infrastructure upon 
which all others rely. 
Last, this approach does not consider the inherent redundancy of the transmission grid. 
When a line or substation is out of service, the TSO can reroute power through other 
circuits. In fact, the ENTSO-E Continental Europe Operation Handbook (11) requires that 
the loss of any single element (such as line, generating unit or transformer) shall not 
cause a cascading failure outside the border of the affected TSO (N-1 principle). Although 
the assumption of a power outage resulting from the loss of a substation is supported 
from empirical data to a certain extent, as discussed in Chapter 2 and Karagiannis et al. 
(2017a), the results may be an overestimation of the probability and consequences of 
the power outage. 
Opportunities for further research include the extension of the approach to other critical 
infrastructure systems, provided that appropriate fragility functions are available. In 
addition, the methodology could arguably be improved if it were combined with network 
analysis to help determine the cascading effects of the loss of one substation to the grid. 
Another possible improvement would be the consideration of population, land-use and 
economy dynamics in the estimation of the impact from the interruption of the daily 
economic activity. Last, the findings of Chapter 2 can be combined with information from 
previous studies (among others, Karagiannis, et al., 2017a; Petermann et al., 2011) to 
identify cost-effective and sustainable, structural and organizational protection measures 
for critical infrastructure against selected natural hazards. 
  
                                           
(11) European Network of Transmission System Operates for Electricity, Continental Europe Operation 
Handbook, https://docstore.entsoe.eu/publications/system-operations-reports/operation-
handbook/Pages/default.aspx (accessed November 29, 2018) 
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4 Recommendations for disaster risk management 
The findings of this study reinforce and confirm several recommendations discussed in 
Karagiannis et al. (2017a), outlined in Table 6. The reader is referred to that previous 
study for a detailed discussion of these recommendations. The evidence discussed here 
justifies these Recommendations based on the same rationale as in Karagiannis et al. 
(2017a). One addition could be made to Recommendation 6 pursuant to this is that 
Emergency Restoration Systems (ERS) should be part of the emergency response 
equipment cache of any TSO or DSO whose assets are located in high-risk areas for 
storm loading. 
Table 6. Recommendations from Karagiannis et al. (2017a) supported by the findings of Chapter 2 
of this report 
Recommendation 3 Transition from hardening system assets and facilities to 
building resilience into the grid. 
Recommendation 5 TSOs/DSOs should develop, implement and exercise emergency 
operations plans. These plans should be updated when gaps are 
identified, e.g. in case of climate change. 
Recommendation 6 Stockpile spare items to expedite the repair or replacement of 
key assets and equipment. 
Recommendation 7 Ensure interoperability among neighboring TSOs, TSOs and 
DSOs, and between TSOs/DSOs and emergency management 
organizations. 
Source: Karagiannis et al., 2017a. 
Besides reinforcing several recommendations from a previous study, the findings of this 
study support four additional recommendations about disaster management for critical 
energy infrastructure. 
Recommendation 1: Consider increasing transmission tower design requirements for 
resistance to wind loading in standards and regulations. 
Chapter 2 illustrated that utility poles (i.e. transmission towers and distribution poles) 
and overhead lines are the most vulnerable component of the power grid to wind storms, 
suffering failures from horizontal wind loading. In addition, Forzieri et al. (2018) 
estimated that the peak wind speed is likely to increase throughout Europe in the future 
and the change is likely to be more pronounced in coastal areas. Chapter 3 showed that, 
for such an area, the increase in the peak wind speed can also increase the risk from 
wind storms, resulting from direct damage to the transmission grid and the ensuing 
power outage. Reinforcing steel lattice tower structures located in coastal and other high-
risk areas to resist wind loads should decrease the risk associated with wind storms. 
Increasing the requirements stipulated in relevant regulations and standards, such as IEC 
Standard 60826 and Eurocode 1 (Part 1-4), could help harmonize design specifications 
across Europe. In addition, structural mitigation measures, such as strengthening the 
foundations of transmission towers to prevent toppling, could also help mitigate against 
flood and earthquake forces. A benefit-cost analysis should be used to analyze the cost-
effectiveness of this approach. The risk assessment methodology introduced in Chapter 3 
could be used to support the calculation of the benefit-cost ratio. 
Recommendation 2: Consider the risk from climate change in investment analyses. 
This study and other publications (Forzieri et al., 2018; Karagiannis et al., 2017b) have 
demonstrated that climate change will change (increase or decrease) the risk posed from 
meteorological hazards to critical infrastructure in Europe. Risk assessments and cost-
benefit analyses are often part of the decision-making process when new infrastructure 
investments are contemplated. If these studies do not consider climate change, they will 
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likely be based on under- or over-estimated assumptions about the frequency and 
intensity of meteorological hazards critical infrastructure assets may be exposed to. The 
methodology presented in Chapter 3 can be used to support such analyses for storms, 
whereas the approach described in Karagiannis et al. (2017b) can be used for similar 
analyses for floods. 
Recommendation 3: Consider events with recurrence intervals longer than 100 years in 
hazard mitigation and emergency planning. 
Although disaster risk assessments will typically analyze several storm scenarios, the 
100-year event is considered the standard reference in hazard mitigation and emergency 
planning for many meteorological hazards. The analysis of the 10-year, 50-year and 100-
year storm scenarios in this study showed that the level of risk would not change 
substantially, largely because the projected peak wind speed values would remain 
relatively stable. Therefore, a prudent disaster risk management approach would be to 
consider events with recurrence intervals longer than 100 years when designing hazard 
mitigation measures. It is also considered a wise emergency management practice to 
develop emergency operations plans based on the worst-case scenario according to 
historical data (Perry & Lindell, 2007). 
Recommendation 4: Standardize mutual aid resources 
The lack of direct interoperability with mutual aid resources and non-traditional 
responders is a notorious disaster response challenge (US Fire Administration, 2015). As 
natural disasters overwhelm emergency response and recovery capabilities, TSOs/DSOs 
turn to neighboring utilities for help. These operations involve many diverse 
organizations and require interoperability among TSOs, DSOs, regulatory agencies and 
civil protection. As discussed in chapter 2 and Karagiannis et al. (2017a), mutual aid 
responses come with a wide range of challenges, including barriers to access, 
coordination and quality. Mutual aid agreements should address several issues, including: 
● Initiation and termination of international assistance. 
● Transportation and entry of repair tools, spare parts and telecommunications and 
information technology equipment. 
● Qualification and credentialing of personnel. Engineering and technician 
professions are generally regulated in most EU Member States, and do not fall 
under the automatic recognition scheme of Directive 2005/36/EC (12). Directive 
2006/123/EC (13) allows professionals, including those exercising regulated 
professions such as engineers and technicians, to provide services across EU 
Member States. Nevertheless, issues such as liability and malpractice insurance 
may not be addressed.  
● Coordination with mutual aid crews and civil protection agencies. 
● Telecommunications, including the use of radios. 
One possible solution could be the standardization of repair crews and similar resources 
under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Resource typing has proven to facilitate 
efficient and effective deployment of resources in the emergency management and 
fire/rescue communities (FEMA, 2017; Mutual Aid System Task Force, Fairfax, VA, 2006). 
In the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Modules are self-sufficient, 
standardized task forces, capable of being deployed overseas at a short notice to 
augment the response capabilities of a disaster-affected country (14). Several other types 
                                           
(12) Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications (OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 22-142) 
(13) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in 
the internal market (OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36-68) 
(14) Commission Implementing Decision of 16 October 2014 laying down rules for the implementation of 
Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism and repealing Commission Decisions 2004/277/EC, Euratom and 2007/606/EC, Euratom (OJ L 
320, 6.11.2014, p. 1-45) 
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of resources, including experts and equipment, can be requested via DG ECHO’s Common 
Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS). The system has proven to 
be versatile enough to manage various types of international assistance, including large 
power generators (DG ECHO, 2012). Therefore, mutual aid resources for electric power 
companies could be standardized under the UCPM. Analyzing this policy, including its 
effects, costs and feasibility, should be a joint endeavor of ENTSO-E and DG ECHO, while 
the JRC could have a supporting role. 
Recommendation 5: Plan for surge capabilities and external contractors. 
When disaster strikes, electric power companies often rely on contractors to augment 
their emergency repair and restoration capability on short notice. TSOs and DSOs should 
prepare for these operations before disaster strikes. Planning and preparedness should 
address resource management, documentation, finance, administration, insurance and 
other topics. Power companies should consider entering into standby contracts with local 
and regional contractors to minimize delays and administrative challenges. Staff need to 
be trained according to their duties and responsibilities. Last, these procedures need to 
be exercised together with external contractors, with a view to improving coordination 
and communications, and clarifying roles and responsibilities.  
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Annex 
This annex includes a list of the storms reviewed in this study, listed in Table 7 by 
continent. 
 
Table 7. Storms reviewed in this study, by continent 
Date Country/Region 
Storm 
type/name 
Peak wind 
speed 
(km/h) 
Europe 
1 September 1996 France Wind storm 116-179 
25 December 1999 France Cyclone Lothar 150-250 
28 December 1999 France Cyclone Martin 200 
7-9 January 2005 Estonia Cyclone Gudrun 
(Erwin) 
135 
7-9 January 2005 Sweden Cyclone Gudrun 
(Erwin) 
165 
26 November 2005 Western Europe Snow storm 65 
17 January 2007 UK Cyclone Kyrill 160 
18 January 2007 Germany Cyclone Kyrill 202 
18 January 2007 Czech Republic Cyclone Kyrill 200 
23-27 January 2009 France Cyclone Klaus 198 
26 February-7 March 
2010 
Portugal Cyclone Xynthia 228 
26 December 2011 Finland Tapani Storm 
(Cyclone Dagmar) 
108 
18-24 January 2013 Portugal Cyclone Gong 140 
1 October 2013 Finland Cyclone Eino 120 
13 December 2013 Sweden Cyclone Ivar  
13 December 2013 Estonia Cyclone Ivar 115 
1 January 2018 France Storm Carmen 130 
3 January 2018 France Storm Eleanor 140 
18 January 2018 Germany Cyclone Friederike 203 
42 
North America 
21 September 1989 US Hurricane Hugo 260 
4-10 January 1998 US Ice storm  
4-10 January 1998 Canada Ice storm  
25 September 1998 US Hurricane Georges 175 
30 January 2002 US Snow storm  
22 July 2003 US Wind storm 144 
29 August 2005 US Hurricane Katrina 201 
24 September 2005  US Hurricane Rita 290 
22-25 October 2005 US Hurricane Wilma 190 
14 December 2006 US Wind storm 183 
1-4 December 2007 US Wind Storm 235 
2 September 2008 US Hurricane Gustav 340 
13 September 2008 US Hurricane Ike 177 
11-12 December 2008 US Winter storm  
27-28 January 2009 US Ice storm  
25 July 2010 US Wind storm 96-112 
26 August 2011 US Hurricane Irene 230 
28 August 2012 US Hurricane Isaac 128 
29-30 October 2012 US Hurricane Sandy 155 
22 December 2013 US Ice storm  
22 December 2013 Canada Ice storm  
29 August 2015 US Wind storm 145 
17 November 2015 US Wind storm 122 
25 February 2017 US Wind storm 96.5 
25 August 2017 US Hurricane Harvey 120 
10 September 2017 US Hurricane Irma 215 
20 September 2017 US Hurricane Maria 250 
43 
Oceania 
10 January 1997 New Zealand Cyclone Drena 130 
28-29 February 2004 New Zealand Cyclone Ivy 124 
26 January 2011 New Zealand Cyclone Wilma 260 
2 February 2011 New Zealand and 
Australia 
Cyclone Yasi 290 
11-15 December 2012 Samoa Cyclone Evan 210 
7-17 March 2014 New Zealand Cyclone Lusi 130 
2-14 March 2015 New Zealand Cyclone Pam 320 
28 March 2017 New Zealand and 
Australia 
Cyclone Debbie 263 
9-14 April 2017 New Zealand Cyclone Cook  200 
8 November 2017 New Zealand Storm with rain 
and snow 
154 
5 January 2018 New Zealand Wind storm 128 
Asia 
24 January 2008 China Winter storm  
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